Middle East Policy
On these pages I have yet to opine on a comprehensive Middle East strategy, there has been so much said and printed that I have taken my time and was hoping to stay on the sidelines until several realistic options had emerged.
Now that the Iraq Study Group's report has been released, and the Administration has proposed its own strategy, I feel that I can form an opinion. From the beginning, the ISG had the feeling of being another fruitless attempt to create consensus by bringing together a group of individuals with enough moral gravitas to be beyond reproach. Unfortunately the consensus, as is often the case with compromise, took a little piece from a multiple of different strategies and tried to create one all encompassing document. Unfortunately, this assortment of different initiatives I do not believe forms a coherent Middle East Policy, and many of the recommendations I believe are dangerously misguided. One problem I believe that a comprehensive coherent Middle East Policy is a fallacy. The overarching weakness and failure of this administration has been to chronically oversimplify, specifically when attempting to lump the many religious, tribal, geographical, and political woes of the Middle East into one policy. Of course they have similarities, they may even have some underpinnings of correlation, however, there is not one solution, and solving one issue will most likely create new issues elsewhere. Thus I cannot try to propose a Middle East Policy, but perhaps a different strategy for each conflict. Today I will try to tackle Iraq.
Seemingly, for the first time since the George W. Bush backed the Dubai Ports deal, I am in agreement with the President: we cannot abandon Iraq now that we have destabilized it religiously, politically, and tribally. To grossly oversimplify: you break, you buy. Among several blunders that have been characterized time and time again, by wiser men then I, I believe we attempted to occupy Iraq with a force much lighter then was required, attempting to "search and destroy" rather then "clean and hold." We would search for armed bands, clear the area and move on, unfortunately, right after we left the insurgents would simply fill the void. The United States not only has a moral obligation to the Iraqi (Middle Eastern) people, but has an obligation to its own citizens not to leave a failed state in the middle of the most tumultuous region in the World, that may or may-not descend into a safe-haven for terrorism. I of course, do not know what would happen if the U.S. were to pull-out from Iraq, but I believe it would be a gross miscalculation.
Many have opined that by the United States leaving it would not give the Iraqis a reason to fight. This is misguided, the glue holding the Iraqi "nation" together was Saddam Hussein, once that was removed, the void was filled with the chaos that had enveloped the peoples of Mesopotamia every time a void was created: ethnic, religious, and tribal war. Many have opined that the time has come for the Iraqis to help themselves, that we have done all we have done for them; a feeble attempt to pass the blame. Regardless of what the greater majority of reasonable Iraqis want, they do not have the ability to quell the violent actions of the religious and political factions. By inserting more troops into Iraq we can first provide security for the Iraqis: without security and basic human requirements (electricity, shelter, water) we cannot expect them to build the robust institutions that a representative democracy requires. Key to this strategy is the argument of whether the "Nation" of Iraq exists at all, can it ever exist under any means other then brutal oppression? Perhaps not, but any fragmentation of the nation into separate states should take place not under duress, but under a secure political environment, which I believe cannot exist without more U.S. troops.
Central to its broader Middle East strategy, the ISG has decided that solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue would relive some of the animosity that the Arab world has against the United States. I believe that it is an important issue, that deserves the resources of the United States, however, I do not believe that a solution to the crisis could be achieved in time to help the Iraqi Civil War nor would it help end the war if it were solved. Therefore, as it may be part of a broader Middle East strategy, I do not think that it would help solve the Iraqi Civil War and thus will write on the conflict at a later time.
We must deploy more troops to Iraq in order to increase the security situation for Iraqis. Once there is relative peace and basic human necessities we can begin to focus on building the institutions necessary for democracy. We must engage Iran and Syria, although they may have a short term interest in seeing America bogged down in Iraq, they only do so because they see it as a deterrent to any potential American military attacks against their own countries. If they were of the belief that America did not have that intention a priori, I believe it would be in their best interest to help stabilize Iraq and at least negotiate in good faith.
Now that the Iraq Study Group's report has been released, and the Administration has proposed its own strategy, I feel that I can form an opinion. From the beginning, the ISG had the feeling of being another fruitless attempt to create consensus by bringing together a group of individuals with enough moral gravitas to be beyond reproach. Unfortunately the consensus, as is often the case with compromise, took a little piece from a multiple of different strategies and tried to create one all encompassing document. Unfortunately, this assortment of different initiatives I do not believe forms a coherent Middle East Policy, and many of the recommendations I believe are dangerously misguided. One problem I believe that a comprehensive coherent Middle East Policy is a fallacy. The overarching weakness and failure of this administration has been to chronically oversimplify, specifically when attempting to lump the many religious, tribal, geographical, and political woes of the Middle East into one policy. Of course they have similarities, they may even have some underpinnings of correlation, however, there is not one solution, and solving one issue will most likely create new issues elsewhere. Thus I cannot try to propose a Middle East Policy, but perhaps a different strategy for each conflict. Today I will try to tackle Iraq.
Seemingly, for the first time since the George W. Bush backed the Dubai Ports deal, I am in agreement with the President: we cannot abandon Iraq now that we have destabilized it religiously, politically, and tribally. To grossly oversimplify: you break, you buy. Among several blunders that have been characterized time and time again, by wiser men then I, I believe we attempted to occupy Iraq with a force much lighter then was required, attempting to "search and destroy" rather then "clean and hold." We would search for armed bands, clear the area and move on, unfortunately, right after we left the insurgents would simply fill the void. The United States not only has a moral obligation to the Iraqi (Middle Eastern) people, but has an obligation to its own citizens not to leave a failed state in the middle of the most tumultuous region in the World, that may or may-not descend into a safe-haven for terrorism. I of course, do not know what would happen if the U.S. were to pull-out from Iraq, but I believe it would be a gross miscalculation.
Many have opined that by the United States leaving it would not give the Iraqis a reason to fight. This is misguided, the glue holding the Iraqi "nation" together was Saddam Hussein, once that was removed, the void was filled with the chaos that had enveloped the peoples of Mesopotamia every time a void was created: ethnic, religious, and tribal war. Many have opined that the time has come for the Iraqis to help themselves, that we have done all we have done for them; a feeble attempt to pass the blame. Regardless of what the greater majority of reasonable Iraqis want, they do not have the ability to quell the violent actions of the religious and political factions. By inserting more troops into Iraq we can first provide security for the Iraqis: without security and basic human requirements (electricity, shelter, water) we cannot expect them to build the robust institutions that a representative democracy requires. Key to this strategy is the argument of whether the "Nation" of Iraq exists at all, can it ever exist under any means other then brutal oppression? Perhaps not, but any fragmentation of the nation into separate states should take place not under duress, but under a secure political environment, which I believe cannot exist without more U.S. troops.
Central to its broader Middle East strategy, the ISG has decided that solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue would relive some of the animosity that the Arab world has against the United States. I believe that it is an important issue, that deserves the resources of the United States, however, I do not believe that a solution to the crisis could be achieved in time to help the Iraqi Civil War nor would it help end the war if it were solved. Therefore, as it may be part of a broader Middle East strategy, I do not think that it would help solve the Iraqi Civil War and thus will write on the conflict at a later time.
We must deploy more troops to Iraq in order to increase the security situation for Iraqis. Once there is relative peace and basic human necessities we can begin to focus on building the institutions necessary for democracy. We must engage Iran and Syria, although they may have a short term interest in seeing America bogged down in Iraq, they only do so because they see it as a deterrent to any potential American military attacks against their own countries. If they were of the belief that America did not have that intention a priori, I believe it would be in their best interest to help stabilize Iraq and at least negotiate in good faith.
posted by Anon. at 4:36 PM
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