The right strategy, the wrong tactics
In a previous post I advocated sending more troops into Iraq. On the surface this seems to coincide with President Bush's plan, however, I do not have confidence in the ability of this administration to effectively carry out the strategy. To begin, the best estimates of competent military commanders, including General Petraeus, is that to occupy an area effectively, an army requires a presence of approximately 20 troops per 1,000 persons. Baghdad has a population of about 6 million people, so to clear, hold, and rebuild would require roughly 120,000 soldiers-right now the US has 70,000 combat troops in Iraq, adding 20,000 would still be much less then is thought to be required. The new plan has a similar stink to many of the failed policies of the past four years: overoptimism, poor-planning, and an inability to consider alternatives.
Here, James Fallows comments:
The proposition that Iraq can be “fixed” by an increase in troop numbers that is (a) modest enough not to require a huge re-mobilization and reconfiguration of U.S. deployments around the world, and (b) brief enough to count as a “surge” rather than an “escalation” or “re-invasion,” is fantasy.
Fallows goes on to reference this piece, entitled Stalingrad on the Tigris, by Retired Colonel Patrick Lang. Referencing Kagan's AEI piece that advocates a "surge":
The paper urges a "surge" of many thousands more US troops into Baghdad beginning in March, 2007 for one more grand roll of the iron dice. The concept seems to be based on the notion that Shia militias exist because of Sunni violence against them rather than as expressions of a Shia drive to political dominance in Iraq. Based on that belief the authors seem to believe that if the additional US and Iraqi forces to be employed in the Capital area defeat (destroy?) the Sunni insurgent groups, then the Shia militia armies will "wither away" from a lack of need. I do not think that belief is justified.
The crucial question is whether to abandon the strategy of an increase in troop levels altogether for the lack of confidence in the execution abilities of this administration, or to accept the "surge" with all its flaws. I'll reserve opinion until Bush makes his speech tomorrow.
Here, James Fallows comments:
The proposition that Iraq can be “fixed” by an increase in troop numbers that is (a) modest enough not to require a huge re-mobilization and reconfiguration of U.S. deployments around the world, and (b) brief enough to count as a “surge” rather than an “escalation” or “re-invasion,” is fantasy.
Fallows goes on to reference this piece, entitled Stalingrad on the Tigris, by Retired Colonel Patrick Lang. Referencing Kagan's AEI piece that advocates a "surge":
The paper urges a "surge" of many thousands more US troops into Baghdad beginning in March, 2007 for one more grand roll of the iron dice. The concept seems to be based on the notion that Shia militias exist because of Sunni violence against them rather than as expressions of a Shia drive to political dominance in Iraq. Based on that belief the authors seem to believe that if the additional US and Iraqi forces to be employed in the Capital area defeat (destroy?) the Sunni insurgent groups, then the Shia militia armies will "wither away" from a lack of need. I do not think that belief is justified.
The crucial question is whether to abandon the strategy of an increase in troop levels altogether for the lack of confidence in the execution abilities of this administration, or to accept the "surge" with all its flaws. I'll reserve opinion until Bush makes his speech tomorrow.

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