The "Surge" cont...

From Fred Kagan of the AEI, the architect of the mis-labeled "surge" policy, in a December policy piece. From The Belgravia Dispatch (his highlights):

Clearing and holding the Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in the center of Baghdad, which are the keys to getting the overall levels of violence down, will require around nine American combat brigades (27 battalions, in partnership with Iraqi forces, divided among some 23 districts). Since there are about five brigades in Baghdad now, achieving this level would require a surge of at least four additional combat brigades--some 20,000 combat troops. Moreover, it would be foolhardy to send precisely as many troops as we think we need. Sound planning requires a reserve of at least one brigade (5,000 soldiers) to respond to unexpected developments. The insurgents have bases beyond Baghdad, especially in Anbar province. Securing Baghdad requires addressing these bases--a task that would necessitate at least two more Marine regiments (around 7,000 Marines). It is difficult to imagine a responsible plan for getting the violence in and around Baghdad under control that could succeed with fewer than 30,000 combat troops beyond the forces already in Iraq.

You can read Kagan's complete Choosing Victory piece here in PDF format. As I previously posted, although I support the idea of sending additional troops to Iraq to secure Baghdad, I do not think 20,000 is sufficient, but faced with the alternative of withdrawal, I support it.