Conservatism

On these pages I have lamented unfortunate choice between the Democrat and Republican Party candidates. The choice has most recently been between a dangerously incapable, delusional, and fundamentalist Republican administration and a Democratic candidate that openly supports policy that goes against my political views. Recently many political commentators have been decrying the Administration's abuse of the conservative title, claiming that the Admin. does not practice what are considered traditional conservative values. Glenn Greenwald takes many of the pundits to task:

All of this brings us back to Rich Lowry and Newt Gingrich and the emerging deceit which the conservative movement is attempting to perpetrate. In contrast to the vast majority of so-called "conservatives" who loyally stood by and cheered on the Bush Presidency and the "disgraced" Republican Congress, there were a handful of conservatives who -- long before Bush's popularity collapsed -- were pointing out just how "un-conservative" the Bush movement was. Sullivan was one such person, along with people like Bruce Bartlett and Pat Buchanan and The American Conservative. And they were treated like blasphemers and pariahs by the Lowry/National Review/Gingrich/Weekly Standard conservatives, because the "Conservative Movement" became synonymous with the Bush Movement, and it therefore became impossible to repudiate the latter without being cast out of the former.

One of the principal flaws of Sullivan's book is that it speaks of "political conservatism" in a way that exists only in the abstract but never in reality. The fabled Goldwater/Reagan small-government "conservatism of doubt" which Sullivan hails -- like the purified, magnanimous form of Communism -- exists, for better or worse, only in myth.

While it is true that Bush has presided over extraordinary growth in federal spending, so did Reagan. Though Bush's deficit spending exceeds that of Reagan's, it does so only by degree, not level. The pornography-obsessed Ed Meese and the utter lawlessness of the Iran-contra scandal were merely the Reagan precursors to the Bush excesses which Sullivan finds so "anti-conservative." The Bush presidency is an extension, an outgrowth, of the roots of political conservatism in this country, not a betrayal of them.

All of the attributes which have made the Bush presidency so disastrous are not in conflict with political conservatism as it exists in reality. Those attributes -- vast expansions of federal power to implement moralistic agendas and to perpetuate political power, along with authoritarian faith in the Leader -- are not violations of "conservative principles." Those have become the defining attributes of the Conservative Movement in this country.

That is why the warnings from Sullivan and others that the Republican Party was acting in violation of "conservative principles" fell on deaf ears and even prompted such hostility -- until, that is, Bush's popularity collapsed. "Conservative principles" are marketing props used by the Conservative Movement to achieve political power, not actual beliefs. Sullivan's principal argument that the Bush presidency never adhered to conservative principles is true enough, but the same can be said of the entire American conservative political movement. That is why they bred and elevated George Bush for six years, and suddenly "realized" that he was "not a conservative" only once political expediency required it.

Hypocrisy and Foreign Policy

Any serious observer of international politics has noticed the disconnect between the U.S. Administration's rhetoric on the support of freedom and pluralism, with its policy and benevolent treatment of autocratic regimes. The ideal has been espoused publicly by Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, then flaunted during subsequent meetings, and by financial/military support for leaders that limit the liberal movements in domestic political struggles. During Rice's last visit to Egypt, after the lofty AUC speech that I have written about on these pages, Rice stood hand in hand with the Egyptian Foreign Minister espousing the special relationship shared between the two regimes: with not a word mentioned regarding the most recent human right violations.

In last night's State of the Union Address, George W. Bush, insultingly uttered this fallacy:

To prevail, we must remove the conditions that inspire blind hatred, and drove 19 men to get onto airplanes and to come and kill us. What every terrorist fears most is human freedom -- societies where men and women make their own choices, answer to their own conscience, and live by their hopes instead of their resentments.

Free people are not drawn to violent and malignant ideologies -- and most will choose a better way when they're given a chance. So we advance our own security interests by helping moderates and reformers and brave voices for democracy. The great question of our day is whether America will help men and women in the Middle East to build free societies and share in the rights of all humanity. And I say, for the sake of our own security, we must.

Echoing these remarks in the 2006 State of the Union Address:

All fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated, and live free from poverty and violence. No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.

But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. (Applause.)

America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.

As the fallacy of the Administration's motivation for invading Iraq became transparent, the Administration sought other justification for the costly endeavour: a policy of freedom and liberty, advancing those lofty American ideals around the world. As George W. Bush sought to convince lawmakers and the U.S. populace that we could change the political and social outlook of the Middle East by achieving success in Iraq (installing a pro-Western, democratically elected government); that would ultimately lead to other Middle Eastern nations realizing the benefits of democratic populism, creating a domino effect of pro-western, oil rich nations free from radicalism. A worthy goal, however, in retrospect the naivety is frightening.

The problem with using this motivator for American policy and sacrifice is that it calls for some modicum of consistency. Thus, we could not advocate the policy as a cause for continued sacrifice in Iraq while ignoring the policy in the other Middle Eastern countries. Unfortunately, the majority of U.S. allies in the Middle East are autocratic regimes that routinely limit the personal freedoms of their people, without regard for basic human rights. This presents an interesting dilemma for the Administration; not surprisingly it seems they have chosen to simply ignore the obvious hypocrisy. So while President Bush and Condoleeza Rice go on about the U.S. interest in supporting liberal movements, they simply ignore them and their tragic plight in every country besides Iraq and Iran.

I am not ignorant to realist foreign policy, that by supporting these regimes the U.S. supports stability rather then allowing what happened in Palestine through democratic elections, the election of a group openly hostile to the United States and its allies. That is a logical foreign policy argument, not one that i agree with, but logically sound regardless. The danger comes when America, and its President's words, become meaningless. When the American people and its soldiers cannot trust the motivations of its leaders, when the repressed people of the world on the cusp of revolt do not believe the strongest country in the world will live up to its word and support them. By hanging these friends out to dry we risk alienating the only progressive movements in the region, possibly pushing these moderates to the extreme left, resulting in a two ideology environment: radicals on the far left and fundamentalists on the far right, both somehow disillusioned by the hollow words of the United States.

We Reap What We Sow

Egypt had been out of the headlines until this piece Rice Speaks Softly in the Egypt, Avoiding Democracy, in the New York Times, that explores the contradictions and dangers of US policy in Egypt. Several excerpts:

Ms. Rice, who once lectured Egyptians on the need to respect the rule of law, did not address those domestic concerns. Instead, with Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit by her side, she talked about her appreciation for Egypt’s support in the region.

It was clear that the United States — facing chaos in Iraq, rising Iranian influence and the destabilizing Israeli-Palestinian conflict — had decided that stability, not democracy, was its priority, Egyptian political commentators, political aides and human rights advocates said.

At the same time, where Washington was criticized in the past for supporting repressive governments, it risks even sharper criticism now because it made such a public commitment to promoting democracy.

Ms. Rice raised the bar herself when she visited American University here in 2005 and said in a speech: “We are all concerned for the future of Egypt’s reforms when peaceful supporters of democracy — men and women — are not free from violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees — and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice.”

Since then, Egypt’s government has piled up a long list of repressive actions, including ordering the police to block people from voting in parliamentary elections; delaying local elections by two years; imprisoning an opposition leader, Ayman Nour, on charges widely seen as politically motivated; battling with judges who have demanded oversight of elections; and imprisoning Talaat el-Sadat, a member of Parliament and the nephew of President Anwar el-Sadat, for a year in a military jail after he criticized the armed forces on television.

U.S. support for the despotic regime of Hosni Mubarak has long-served U.S. purposes: stability and secularism, at the expense of the liberties of the Egyptian people. In Rice's above mentioned speech at AUC, echoing the empty rhetoric of George W. Bush's second inaugural address, she lead liberal Egyptians to believe that the United States would recognize and support the groups that aimed to liberalize Egyptian society and politics. Mubarak was savy enough to placate his American benefactors by seemingly loosening the restrictions on political parties and candidates outside of his own party, the ironically named National Democratic Party. Once the elections actually took place he brutally suppressed the ability of any other candidates to mount a serious campaign, ultimately, the most liberal candidates would end up in Egyptian prisons on trumped up charges.

Not surprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood was the true benefactor of the supposed liberalization. Running under the banner of Independent candidacy, the Muslim Brotherhood is officially banned as a political party, the group made major gains in most regions and would have probably surpassed the NDP had it not been for wide scale voter intimidation and ballot rigging. Mubarak is unable to reign in the Islamic party in the same way that he is able to suppress the liberal candidates because of the popular strength of political Islam. It is ironic that Mubarak's dictatorship is partly to blame for the popularity of political Islam, although it is certainly become a regional trend, the only way for Egyptians to express any opinion outside of those in direct support of Mubarak is through the Mosque. That said, Mubarak and the state security services have also been ruthless in their suppression of Islamists, from time to time, particularly after terrorist attacks, rounding up hundreds of supposed Islamic militants and tossing them in jail. In spite of this, the regime's tolerance, for what in Egypt can be considered moderate political Islam, has allowed the ideas to flourish. I doubt that even with his overwhelming security apparatus Mubarak could suppress or jail the moderate (again by Egyptian standard) Islamic clerics without widespread public discontent.

When will America realize that over the long term it is subversive to US interests to support autocratic regimes in the interest of stability, over liberal movements within a country. Unfortunately many of the liberal candidates and supporters felt empowered by Rice's initial comments and thus tried to enter the public political fray, exposing themselves to Mubarak's security services. They learned the hard lesson not to take the United States at its word and we further empowered the regime. Interesting times are ahead once Mubarak dies or passes on the Presidency; are the people so crushed that they would simply accept it if Mubarak cedes power to his son Gamal, would the U.S. oppose?

The "Surge" cont...

From Fred Kagan of the AEI, the architect of the mis-labeled "surge" policy, in a December policy piece. From The Belgravia Dispatch (his highlights):

Clearing and holding the Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in the center of Baghdad, which are the keys to getting the overall levels of violence down, will require around nine American combat brigades (27 battalions, in partnership with Iraqi forces, divided among some 23 districts). Since there are about five brigades in Baghdad now, achieving this level would require a surge of at least four additional combat brigades--some 20,000 combat troops. Moreover, it would be foolhardy to send precisely as many troops as we think we need. Sound planning requires a reserve of at least one brigade (5,000 soldiers) to respond to unexpected developments. The insurgents have bases beyond Baghdad, especially in Anbar province. Securing Baghdad requires addressing these bases--a task that would necessitate at least two more Marine regiments (around 7,000 Marines). It is difficult to imagine a responsible plan for getting the violence in and around Baghdad under control that could succeed with fewer than 30,000 combat troops beyond the forces already in Iraq.

You can read Kagan's complete Choosing Victory piece here in PDF format. As I previously posted, although I support the idea of sending additional troops to Iraq to secure Baghdad, I do not think 20,000 is sufficient, but faced with the alternative of withdrawal, I support it.

Iraq, "The Way Forward"

Following George W. Bush's speech on Iraq, Andrew Sullivan has the following response. I agree with nearly all of it (my bolds).

The premise of the speech, and of the strategy, is that there is a national democratic government in Baghdad, defending itself against Jihadist attacks. The task, in the president's mind, is therefore to send more troops to defend such a government. But the reality facing us each day is a starkly different one from the scenario assumed by the president. The government of which Bush speaks, to put it bluntly, does not exist. The reality illumined by the lynching of Saddam is that the Maliki government is a front for Shiite factions and dependent for its future on Shiite death squads. U.S. support for the government is not, therefore, a defense of democracy in a unified country, whatever our intentions. It is putting the lives of American soldiers in defense of the Shiite side in an increasingly brutal civil war.

What we will discover in the next few months, therefore, is simply whether the entire premise of this strategy is actually true. The president is asking us to find this out one more time. He seems to disbelieve the overwhelming evidence on the ground - that the dynamic has changed beyond recognition. His intellectual rubric - democracy versus terror - has not changed to deal with fast-changing events, or to take account of the sectarian dynamic that his appallingly managed occupation has spawned. And so his strategy is no surprise. It would have made sense in 2004, when so many of us were begging for more troops, only to be dismissed as fair-weather warriors, terror-supporters, or lily-livered wimps. We were right. This president was disastrously wrong - and clung to his disproved strategy in the face of overwhelming evidence, supported by the Republican right regardless, until it simply became impossible to sustain the lie any longer.

If the president tonight had outlined a serious attempt to grapple with this new situation - a minimum of 50,000 new troops as a game-changer - then I'd eagerly be supporting him. But he hasn't. 21,500 U.S. troops is once again, I fear, just enough troops to lose.

As I, and the majority of the readers of this blog are not political insiders with the ability to influence policy in any meaningful manner, we are left to choose between two strategies for Iraq: George W. Bush's call for an increase of approx. 20,000 US troops or a phased withdrawal. Although I was a fervent opponent of the war, I now believe that we cannot simply withdraw, and the only way to succeed is to increase the amount of ground forces.

The right strategy, the wrong tactics

In a previous post I advocated sending more troops into Iraq. On the surface this seems to coincide with President Bush's plan, however, I do not have confidence in the ability of this administration to effectively carry out the strategy. To begin, the best estimates of competent military commanders, including General Petraeus, is that to occupy an area effectively, an army requires a presence of approximately 20 troops per 1,000 persons. Baghdad has a population of about 6 million people, so to clear, hold, and rebuild would require roughly 120,000 soldiers-right now the US has 70,000 combat troops in Iraq, adding 20,000 would still be much less then is thought to be required. The new plan has a similar stink to many of the failed policies of the past four years: overoptimism, poor-planning, and an inability to consider alternatives.

Here, James Fallows comments:

The proposition that Iraq can be “fixed” by an increase in troop numbers that is (a) modest enough not to require a huge re-mobilization and reconfiguration of U.S. deployments around the world, and (b) brief enough to count as a “surge” rather than an “escalation” or “re-invasion,” is fantasy.

Fallows goes on to reference this piece, entitled Stalingrad on the Tigris, by Retired Colonel Patrick Lang. Referencing Kagan's AEI piece that advocates a "surge":

The paper urges a "surge" of many thousands more US troops into Baghdad beginning in March, 2007 for one more grand roll of the iron dice. The concept seems to be based on the notion that Shia militias exist because of Sunni violence against them rather than as expressions of a Shia drive to political dominance in Iraq. Based on that belief the authors seem to believe that if the additional US and Iraqi forces to be employed in the Capital area defeat (destroy?) the Sunni insurgent groups, then the Shia militia armies will "wither away" from a lack of need. I do not think that belief is justified.

The crucial question is whether to abandon the strategy of an increase in troop levels altogether for the lack of confidence in the execution abilities of this administration, or to accept the "surge" with all its flaws. I'll reserve opinion until Bush makes his speech tomorrow.

Middle East Policy

On these pages I have yet to opine on a comprehensive Middle East strategy, there has been so much said and printed that I have taken my time and was hoping to stay on the sidelines until several realistic options had emerged.

Now that the Iraq Study Group's report has been released, and the Administration has proposed its own strategy, I feel that I can form an opinion. From the beginning, the ISG had the feeling of being another fruitless attempt to create consensus by bringing together a group of individuals with enough moral gravitas to be beyond reproach. Unfortunately the consensus, as is often the case with compromise, took a little piece from a multiple of different strategies and tried to create one all encompassing document. Unfortunately, this assortment of different initiatives I do not believe forms a coherent Middle East Policy, and many of the recommendations I believe are dangerously misguided. One problem I believe that a comprehensive coherent Middle East Policy is a fallacy. The overarching weakness and failure of this administration has been to chronically oversimplify, specifically when attempting to lump the many religious, tribal, geographical, and political woes of the Middle East into one policy. Of course they have similarities, they may even have some underpinnings of correlation, however, there is not one solution, and solving one issue will most likely create new issues elsewhere. Thus I cannot try to propose a Middle East Policy, but perhaps a different strategy for each conflict. Today I will try to tackle Iraq.

Seemingly, for the first time since the George W. Bush backed the Dubai Ports deal, I am in agreement with the President: we cannot abandon Iraq now that we have destabilized it religiously, politically, and tribally. To grossly oversimplify: you break, you buy. Among several blunders that have been characterized time and time again, by wiser men then I, I believe we attempted to occupy Iraq with a force much lighter then was required, attempting to "search and destroy" rather then "clean and hold." We would search for armed bands, clear the area and move on, unfortunately, right after we left the insurgents would simply fill the void. The United States not only has a moral obligation to the Iraqi (Middle Eastern) people, but has an obligation to its own citizens not to leave a failed state in the middle of the most tumultuous region in the World, that may or may-not descend into a safe-haven for terrorism. I of course, do not know what would happen if the U.S. were to pull-out from Iraq, but I believe it would be a gross miscalculation.

Many have opined that by the United States leaving it would not give the Iraqis a reason to fight. This is misguided, the glue holding the Iraqi "nation" together was Saddam Hussein, once that was removed, the void was filled with the chaos that had enveloped the peoples of Mesopotamia every time a void was created: ethnic, religious, and tribal war. Many have opined that the time has come for the Iraqis to help themselves, that we have done all we have done for them; a feeble attempt to pass the blame. Regardless of what the greater majority of reasonable Iraqis want, they do not have the ability to quell the violent actions of the religious and political factions. By inserting more troops into Iraq we can first provide security for the Iraqis: without security and basic human requirements (electricity, shelter, water) we cannot expect them to build the robust institutions that a representative democracy requires. Key to this strategy is the argument of whether the "Nation" of Iraq exists at all, can it ever exist under any means other then brutal oppression? Perhaps not, but any fragmentation of the nation into separate states should take place not under duress, but under a secure political environment, which I believe cannot exist without more U.S. troops.

Central to its broader Middle East strategy, the ISG has decided that solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue would relive some of the animosity that the Arab world has against the United States. I believe that it is an important issue, that deserves the resources of the United States, however, I do not believe that a solution to the crisis could be achieved in time to help the Iraqi Civil War nor would it help end the war if it were solved. Therefore, as it may be part of a broader Middle East strategy, I do not think that it would help solve the Iraqi Civil War and thus will write on the conflict at a later time.

We must deploy more troops to Iraq in order to increase the security situation for Iraqis. Once there is relative peace and basic human necessities we can begin to focus on building the institutions necessary for democracy. We must engage Iran and Syria, although they may have a short term interest in seeing America bogged down in Iraq, they only do so because they see it as a deterrent to any potential American military attacks against their own countries. If they were of the belief that America did not have that intention a priori, I believe it would be in their best interest to help stabilize Iraq and at least negotiate in good faith.

The Case for Withdrawal

One of the many I have read, this one from Sic Semper Tyrannis, I agree with several of the numbered points in one form or another. The points do not address what would be the "on-the-ground" in Iraq situation if we were to withdrawal besides the regional hegemony of Iran; I believe that that issue is the crux of the argument. All the bullet points may or may not come to pass, but the Void is what matters.

Then of course we have the Israeli Likudnik plan - which is to provide the demonic enemy with which the NeoCons have conjured with. If one listens to them one would think that Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, the Taliban, Al Qaeeda, the muslim brotherhood, and the rest of these organisations are part of the evil Islam Inc. which is plotting to take over the known universe, controlled by a group of bearded and bejwelled fiends living in a cave high in the mountains of Iran, even now plotting the destruction of Peoria or some place.

If America backs out of the middle east leaving Iran intact, the following will happen:

1. Iran is now the recognised regional power in the Middle East and will have a very large say in dictating what happens to the remains of Iraq.

2. Israel will be faced with the need to make some form of accomodation (sic) with the Islamic powers in the region.

3. Successive Congresses will bind the President and the military industrial complex hand and foot to prevent a repeat of this folly.

4. Right wing thinktanks and their associated pundits will be discredited.

5. Congress will have to reform taxation to pay for the war (remember when Iraqi Oil revenue was supposed to cover the cost of all this?)

6. A decade of soul searching and reform about the electoral system, the media, campaign finance, lobbying and similar issues will occur - sharply reducing the powers of the current ruling class to manipulate Americans so easily.

Point 6 seems a bit idealistic, inspite of the recent Democratic victory, I have no doubt that the general populace is either too disaffected or unintterested to take any step so dramatic.